In recent years, numerous researchers have remarked on the similarity of the conditions that encourage the acquisition of causal relationships in humans and those that foster Pavlovian conditioning in animals (e.g., Allan, 1993; Shanks & Dickinson, 1987; Wasserman, 1990 Wasserman, , 1993 . The observed similarities have stimulated the suggestion that similar processes underlie these two types of learning. Such a view would be best supported if each specific phenomenon observed within one type of learning were paralleled by an analogous phenomenon within the other type of learning. By and large, this appears to be the case. For example, both Pavlovian responding and causal attribution increase with (a) increasing contingency, that is, causes or conditioned stimuli (CSs) must be both necessary and sufficient for an effect or unconditioned stimulus (US) to occur; (b) improved temporal and spatial contiguity, that is, proximity in time and space; (c) temporal priority, that is, causes or CSs must precede effects or USs; and (d) an absence of an alternative cause or an alternative CS, that is, the opportunity for competition between simultaneously presented Ralph R. Miller, Department of Psychology, State University of New York at Binghamton; Helena Matute, Departamento de Psicologia Basica, Universidad de Deusto, Bilbao, Spain.
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Cue competition can be seen with a number of different procedures including forward and backward blocking (e.g., Chapman, 1991; Dickinson, Shanks, & Evenden, 1984; Kamin, 1968; Martin & Levey, 1991; Shanks, 1985) , the relative validity effect (e.g., Van Hamme, Wagner, Logan, Haberlandt, & Price, 1968) , and overshadowing (e.g., Mackintosh, 1976; Pavlov, 1927) . This article focuses on blocking, which presumably is representative of cue competition in generalJ In a typical procedure examining forward blocking of Pavlovian conditioning, a CS (A) is paired with a US (i.e., A----~US) in Phase 1. Then subjects are exposed to compound presentations of 1 We speak of blocking, relative validity effects, and overshadowing as being different forms of cue competition, implying that there is an underlying similarity among them. In many respects, there are grounds for this assumption. For example, in both causal judgment (e.g., Shanks & Dickinson, 1987) and Pavlovian preparations (e.g., Miller, Kasprow, & Schachtman, 1986 ) deficits in performance due to cue competition appear to be reversible without further training with the target cue, thereby suggesting that all forms of cue competition reflect performance failures rather than acquisition failures. However, within Pavlovian situations, there are some differences in the manipulations that successfully foster recovery from overshadowing and blocking. Overshadowing can often be attenuated by posttraining extinction of the overshadowing stimulus (e.g., Kaufman & Bolles, 1980; Matzel, Schachtman, & Miller, 1985) , whereas blocking does not appear to be influenced by posttraining extinction of the blocking stimulus (e.g., Miller, Schachtman, & Matzel, 1988) . Thus, it may be misleading to treat all forms of cue competition as if they were equivalent. However, the present research is concerned exclusively with blocking.
that CS and a second CS (X) followed by the US (i.e., AX---~US) in Phase 2. Blocking is said to be evident when subsequent responding to the second CS alone (X) during testing is impaired relative to control subjects who did not receive the A----~US pairings of Phase 1. Conventionally, researchers say that the previously established association between the initial CS (A) and the US has blocked learning about (or at least responding to) the second CS (X). Similarly, in a typical procedure examining forward blocking of causal judgment, an event (A) is established as a cause of an effect (E, i.e., A->E) in Phase 1. Then in the presence of that event, a second event (X) is presented immediately prior to the effect (i.e., AX-->E) in Phase 2. Blocking is said to be in evidence when causal attribution of the effect to the second event (X) is impaired relative to control subjects for whom the first event (A) was not initially established as a cause of the effect. Blocking, unless otherwise qualified, ordinarily means forward blocking, which should be distinguished from backward blocking. Thus, the designs we have just described are examples of forward blocking, a procedure in which training with the blocking stimulus (A) alone precedes training with the compound of the blocking and target stimuli (AX). By contrast, in backward-blocking training, training with the compound stimulus (AX-->US) precedes training with the blocking stimulus alone (A->US). Table 1 illustrates the basic procedures for both forward and backward blocking.
Forward blocking is well documented in both Pavlovian conditioning (e.g., Kamin, 1968) and causal judgment (e.g., Dickinson et al., 1984; Shanks & Dickinson, 1987) . However, backward blocking is typically observed in causal judgments by humans (e.g., Chapman, 1991; Shanks, 1985; Van Hamme, 1994; Williams, Sagness, & McPhee, 1994) , but not in Pavlovian conditioning with animals (e.g., Miller, Hallam, & Grahame, 1990; Schweitzer & Green, 1982) . This discrepancy might be grounds for challenging the premise that causal judgments and Pavlovian conditioning have similar or common underlying processes. That is, perhaps the discrepancy occurs because the processes underlying causal judgment are susceptible to backward blocking, whereas the processes underlying Pavlovian conditioning are not.
Alternatively, the discrepancy might reflect differences in Forward blocking A---~US AX-->US X? Forward control C-->US AX-+US X? Backward blocking AX-->US A-*US X? Backward control AX-->US C-->US X? Note. The treatment of control groups in this table is only one of several possible control procedures. A, C, and X are three conditioned stimuli. US = unconditioned stimulus; --> = followed by. The C--->US trials here are merely to equate groups for number of signaled USs. Phase 1 of forward control and Phase 2 of backward control need only preclude establishing A as a signal for the US. the ways that humans and animals process information because backward blocking in causal judgments has been examined exclusively with human subjects and backward blocking in Pavlovian conditioning has been examined exclusively with animal subjects. One specific form of this latter view is to conclude that humans, but not animals, are capable of retrospective processing of information because their learning in Phase 2 that A alone is sufficient for the effect to occur makes them reconsider (discount) the causal role that they attributed to X during Phase 1. These two possibilities could potentially be differentiated by looking for backward blocking of Pavlovian conditioning in human subjects and for backward blocking of causal judgment in animal subjects (although this approach raises the difficult issue of how causal judgment might be assessed in animals).
There is, however, a third potential explanation of the observed differences in backward blocking between Pavlovian responding in animals and causal judgments by humans. Specifically, in previously published backwardblocking studies that have used a Pavlovian preparation with animal subjects, the outcome (US) has always been of high biological significance to the subject (e.g., food, water, footshock); whereas in previously published causal judgment research with human subjects, the effects have been of low biological significance 2 to the subject (events that have little motivational value, e.g., verbal descriptions of relatively minor allergic reactions in hypothetical patients). Thus, differences in the biological significance of the US or effect have confounded prior comparisons between backward blocking in causal judgments by humans and backward blocking in Pavlovian conditioning using animals. Consequently, we chose to examine whether backward blocking in animals could be obtained by using a procedure analogous to that used with human subjects, that is, using stimuli of low biological significance. An alternate strategy might have been to examine backward blocking in causal judgment by humans using effects of biological significance to the subjects.
Let us consider bow the biological significance of stimuli differs between conventional forward-and backwardblocking procedures with animals. In both cases, the blocking and target (i.e., to-be-blocked) stimuli, typically auditory or visual cues of moderate intensity, are initially of low biological significance (see Table 1 ). In forward blocking, the blocking stimulus becomes a cue of high biological significance in Phase 1 by virtue of its pairings with the biologically significant US. In Phase 2, the presence of the blocking stimulus prevents the target stimulus from forming an effective association with the US. 3 Therefore, the target 2 By biological significance, we are referring to a continuous variable assessed by the potential of the stimulus to elicit a response. Presumably, there is a monotonic relationship between the magnitude of the response to the stimulus and what we are calling the biological significance of the stimulus. We elaborate on this variable in the General Discussion.
3 We say "effective" to allow the acquisition of ineffective (i.e., latent) associations (e.g., see Balaz, Gutsin, Cacheiro, & Miller, 1981) .
stimulus does not become a cue of high biological significance and consequently elicits little conditioned responding. However, things are quite different in the case of backward blocking. In Phase 1 of backward blocking, both the blocking and target stimuli become cues of high biological significance by virtue of their joint pairings with the US. In Phase 2, the blocking stimulus alone is further paired with the US in an attempt to reduce the functional association between the target stimulus and the US, and hence the biological significance of target stimulus. But the target stimulus is already of high biological significance as a result of Phase 1 treatment. Hence, in the backward-blocking procedure, the effort is to attenuate the biological significance of a cue (the target stimulus) that is already of high biological significance. By contrast, in the forward-blocking procedure, the effort is to prevent a cue that is not of high biological significance from becoming so.
Our hypothesis is that backward blocking is not observed in animals because cues that are of high biological significance are resistant to reductions in their biological significance and consequently relatively immune to cue competition. In causal judgment tasks using human subjects, the causal effects (analogous to USs in Pavlovian conditioning) tend to be of low biological significance to the subjects. That is, the cover stories used in those situations are clearly fictitious, do not concern biologically significant stimuli, and focus on events supposedly experienced by anonymous third parties. Without being paired with effects of high biological significance, neither the blocking nor target stimuli would be expected to attain high biological significance in Phase 1 of backward blocking. Thus, the effect of backward-blocking treatment in a causal judgment task is not to reduce the biological significance of the target stimulus as a result of strengthening the association between the blocking stimulus and the effect, but simply to reduce the potential role that the subjects may attribute to the target stimulus as a cause of the effect. In contrast, in the animal experiments the effort was not only to attenuate the predictive role of the target stimulus but also to reduce its acquired biological significance.
In Experiments 1 and 2, we used animals as subjects and examined backward blocking in a situation more similar to the experiments that have demonstrated backward blocking in humans, that is, with biologically neutral outcomes during the blocking phases. Under such circumstances, we predicted that backward blocking would emerge despite it not having been previously observed under more conventional circumstances. As previously stated, the prior studies allowed the target stimulus (X) to acquire biological significance in Phase 1.
Experiment 1
The intent of Experiment 1 was to determine if backward blocking occurs in a Pavlovian task with animals when the cues are not made biologically significant until after the blocking treatment. To prevent X from gaining biological significance during Phase 1, we used a sensory preconditioning procedure (e.g., Rizley & Rescorla, 1972) . In a conventional sensory preconditioning procedure, two stimuli of low biological significance (let us call them A and B) are serially paired in Phase 1 (i.e., A---->B, with A serving as a CS and B serving as a surrogate for a conventional US). Then in Phase 2, B is serially paired with a biologically significant US (i.e., B---~US, making B a biologically significant CS). Later, when A is presented during testing, conditioned responding to this cue is observed, whereas responding to A is not seen in control subjects lacking either the Phase 1 pairings or the Phase 2 pairings. The observed responding to A indicates that an association between the two stimuli (A and B) was formed during Phase 1 despite neither of these cues being biologically significant at that time. Thus, A becomes a signal for B during Phase 1 without becoming biologically significant because B itself is not biologically significant during Phase 1.
In Experiment 1, we modified the conventional sensory preconditioning procedure so that both phases of backward blocking were embedded in what is normally the first phase of sensory preconditioning. Table 2 illustrates the central aspects of our three-phase procedure. The first two phases of treatment involved pairings of innocuous auditory cues (X, A, B, C) in the absence of a US of high biological significance. During Phase 1, both the backward-blocking and control groups received simultaneous compound presentations of two neutral stimuli immediately followed by a third neutral stimulus that served as an outcome or surrogate US (i.e., AX--->B). During Phase 2, the backward-blocking group was presented with the blocking stimulus followed by the outcome (A---->B), whereas the control group did not receive these pairings. Instead, the control group was given pairings of the blocking stimulus (A) with a novel nonsignificant stimulus we call Stimulus C (i.e., A--->C), which constituted a treatment comparable to that of the backwardblocking group but lacking the critical A--~B pairings. Then, the outcome from Phases 1 and 2 (B) was made biologically significant for both groups by presenting it followed immediately by a footshock US (B--~US) during Phase 3. The pairings of Stimulus B with a biologically significant US provided a motivational basis for responding so that blocking could be assessed in the subsequent test phase. Finally, both groups were tested on the target stimulus (X) and on the blocking stimulus (A).
In summary, Phase 1 served as the first phase of a traditional sensory preconditioning procedure for the target stimulus (X); Phase 3 served as the second phase of sensory Table 2 Design Summary for Experiment 1 Note. A = buzzer; X = click train; B and C = tone and white noise, counterbalanced; US = unconditioned stimulus (footshock); --> = followed by.
preconditioning. Additionally, Phase 1 also served as the first phase of a backward-blocking procedure for the target stimulus (X); Phase 2 served as the second phase of backward blocking. Blocking was assessed using conditioned suppression of drinking as an index of associative status. The subjects were water-deprived rats that were acclimated to drinking water in the experimental apparatus. The US of Phase 3 was an aversive footshock. At test, the target stimulus (X) was presented while the subjects were drinking. The duration of interrupted drinking, which is a widely used measure of the strength of Pavlovian associations, served as our index of association between the target stimulus (X) and the outcome (B). Thus, the primary dependent variable was the duration of suppression of drinking during presentation of the target stimulus (X) at the time of testing. Presumably, if the target stimulus was a signal for the outcome, it would elicit suppression of drinking. Backward blocking in this situation would take the form of weaker responding (i.e., less suppression of drinking) to the target stimulus (X) by the backward-blocking group than by the control group.
Me~od Subjects
The subjects were 12 male and 12 female naive SpragueDawley rats (100-130 days old) from our own breeding colony. Body weights were 375-420 g for males and 190-310 g for females. The animals were housed in standard hanging cages of stainless steel wire mesh in a vivarium maintained on a 16:8-hr light-dark cycle. Experirnental manipulations occurred approximately halfway through the light portion of the cycle. In the home cage, animals had free access to food (Rat Chow, Ralston-Purina, St. Louis, MO), whereas water availability was gradually reduced to 10 rain/day prior to the start of the study. From the time of weaning until the start of the study, all animals were handled for 30 s three times a week. Subjects were assigned to two groups (n = 12), counterbalanced for sex.
Apparatus
Twelve experimental chambers were used. Each measured 30 × 28 × 27 cm (length × width × height). On one wall beginning at floor level, there was a 4.0 × 3.5 × 5.4 cm (depth × width × height) niche containing a water-filled lick tube. The lick tube was left-fight centered in the niche, 3.5 cm above the floor, and protruded 1.7 cm from the back of the niche. A photobeam 0.5 cm in front of the lick tube was used to monitor drinking (actually, it monitored time spent in the niche). All chambers had clear Plexiglas ceilings and side wails; front and back walls were metal. Chamber floors were 4-mm stainless steel rods spaced 1.6 cm apart, center-to-center. Adjacent rods were connected through NE-2 bulbs that allowed the delivery of scrambled, 5-s, 0.5-mA constant-current footshock provided by a high voltage AC power supply in series with a I-MI) resistor. This footshock served as the US. Each chamber was housed in its own sound-and lightattenuating environmental chest. Dim illumination was provided in each chamber by a #1820 light bulb.
Background noise in each chamber, mostly from a ventilation fan, was 74 dB (C-scale) SPL. Three speakers and a buzzer on separate walls of the environmental chest provided the following auditory cues: a buzzer, which served as the blocking stimulus (A); a click train (6 per s), which served as the target stimulus (X); and a tone (compound of 3,000 and 3,200 Hz) and a white noise, which, counterbalanced within groups, served as the outcomes of low biological significance (B and C). All auditory cues were 8 dB(C) above background. During training, all CS presentations were 5 s in duration.
Procedure
All treatment and testing of any single animal occurred in the same experimental chamber.
Acclimation (Day 1).
Each subject was acclimated to its chamber for 60 min during which the chamber' s lick tube was available. This served to establish a stable baseline for drinking.
Phase 1: Training with the AX compound (Day 2). The lick tubes were removed following acclimation. During a single 60-min session, all subjects were exposed to four compound presentations of the blocking stimulus and the target stimulus followed immediately by Stimulus B (i.e., AX---~B). Onset of B coincided with offset of A and X. Thus, the blocking and blocked stimuli served as signals for B. The pairings were scheduled to occur pseudorandomly within the sessions; they were initiated 10, 20, 37, and 50 min into the session.
Phase 2: Training with A (Days 3-7)
. During daily 60-min sessions, the blocking stimulus (A) was presented four times (with the same intertrial intervals as in Phase 1), each followed immediately by the outcome event B for the backward-blocking group (i.e., A-*B) and by the outcome event C for Group Control (i.e., A---~C). Onset of B or C coincided with offset of A. Thus, the blocking stimulus (A) alone continued to serve as a signal for B in the backward-blocking group but not in the control group.
Phase 3: First-order conditioning of B (Day 8) . During a single 60-min session, all animals were exposed to a total of four pairings of the outcome event (B) with the US (i.e., B---~US) with the same intertrial intervals as in Phase 1. US onset coincided with B offset. The intent of this phase of training was to facilitate later testing by endowing the outcome B with biological significance.
Reacclimation . The lick tubes were returned to the experimental chambers. On each of two days, all animals received a 60-min session during which no nominal CS nor US was presented. This treatment served to restabilize baseline drinking, departure from which served as the dependent variable during testing.
Test with X (Day 11).
During an ll-min session, the target stimulus (X) was presented to each subject upon completion of an initial 5 cumulative seconds of drinking in the absence of any CS and was terminated 10 min thereafter. Thus, each subject was drinking at the onset of the target stimulus, a circumstance that we find reduces within-group variance. The time required for each subject to complete its first 5 cumulative seconds of drinking in the presence of the target stimulus was measured. (Subjects showing a reluctance to drink, defined as taking more than 60 s to complete their initial 5 cumulative seconds of drinking, i.e., prior to onset of the target stimulus, were eliminated from this study and subsequent experiments in this report.)
Test with A (Day 12).
During an 1 l-rain session, each subject was again tested for lick suppression, but this time the test stimulus was the blocking stimulus (A). The procedure was the same as that used in testing the target stimulus on Day 11.
Preanalysis treatment of data. The data from two subjects in each group were lost due to an equipment failure on Day 12. All data from these subjects were deleted from the study; however, the Day 11 data from these subjects were entirely consistent with those of the remaining subjects in the subjects' respective groups. The remaining suppression scores from the two test days in this experiment (and the subsequent studies) were transformed to log seconds to improve the normality of the within-group data, thereby enhancing the appropriateness of our using parametric statistics. An alpha level of p < .05 was adopted as the criterion for statistical significance in all of the experiments in this report.
Results
The main finding of this experiment was less suppression to the target stimulus (X) in the backward-blocking group than in the control. This result is indicative of the phenomenon of backward blocking.
The left side of Figure 1 depicts mean time to drink for 5 cumulative seconds in the presence of the target stimulus (X) on Day 11. Inspection of Figure 1 reveals suppression to the target stimulus in the backward-blocking group to be less than that in the control group. Statistical analysis found this difference between the backward-blocking and control groups to be significant, F(1, 18) = 6.27. Additionally, the backward-blocking group's mean time to complete 5 cumulative seconds of drinking prior to onset of the target stimulus and immediately following onset of the target stimulus did not differ, F < 1, which suggests a complete lack of suppression to the target stimulus by the backward-blocking group. This finding mitigates against the possibility that the difference observed between groups in responding to the target stimulus reflected Phase 2 treatments having somehow elevated responding by the control group rather having lowered suppression by the backward-blocking group (Experiment 2 further addresses this possibility). Thus, backward blocking was observed in the backward-blocking group relative to the control group.
The right side of Figure 1 depicts mean time to drink for 5 cumulative seconds in the presence of the blocking stimulus (A) on Day 12. As can be seen in Figure 1 , the backward-blocking group tended to exhibit more suppression to the blocking stimulus than did the control group. However, this difference was not statistically significant, F(1, 18) = 3.09, p = .09. The tendency of the backwardblocking group to show greater suppression to the blocking stimulus than did the control group is not surprising because the backward-blocking group received pairings of the blocking stimulus (A) with the outcome (B) in Phase 2 whereas the control group did not.
On neither test day did any subject take more than 60 s to complete its initial 5 cumulative seconds of drinking prior to onset of the test stimulus. Additionally, the two groups did not differ on this measure on either test day, ps > .5. Thus, the two groups did not exhibit differential fear of the experimental context.
A cue-competition interpretation is fully compatible with the lesser suppression to the target stimulus (X) and (tendency toward) greater suppression to the blocking stimulus (A) observed in the backward-blocking group relative to the control group. The implication is that in the backwardblocking group the greater associative strength of the blocking stimulus retroactively interfered with the potential of the target stimulus to elicit a conditioned response. 
Discussion
The present observation of backward blocking contrasts sharply with prior failures to observe this phenomenon in animals (e.g., Miller et al., 1990; Schweitzer & Green, 1982) . Presumably, the present success in observing backward blocking was due to the target stimulus (X) not having been made biologically significant during Phase 1 of the current experiment. In all prior studies of backward blocking with animals, the target stimulus was made biologically significant by its being paired with a biologically significant US during Phase 1, and backward blocking was not observed.
Experiment 1 provided support for the view that the absence of backward blocking in animal Pavlovian conditioning studies with biologically significant USs arises from the high biological significance of the target stimulus, rather than either from some inherent difference between condi-tioning and causal judgment tasks or from some inherent difference between how animals and humans process information. The present observation of backward blocking in animals is congruent with the previously observed presence of backward blocking in human causal judgment studies, which present only events of low biological significance to the subjects. Thus, this observation is consistent with our view that cues of high biological significance are protected against cue competition. However, Van Hamme (1994), using the revised Rescoda-Wagner model of Van Hamme and Wasserman (1994; also see Markman, 1989; Tassoni, 1995) , has offered an alternative explanation of this difference in backward blocking that focuses on species differences. Here, we briefly describe the revised RescorlaWagner model and consider its ability to explain the results of Experiment 1.
The revised Rescoda-Wagner model is a variant of the Rescoda- Wagner (1972) model. In the original RescorlaWagner model, learning is described by the equation AVcs = a/3()~ -V~), where AVcs is the change in the associative strength of a CS on a given trial, t~ is the associability of the CS,/3 is the associability of the US, ~, the maximum associative strength supportable by the US, and V~ is the summed associative strength of all the CSs present on that trial. For a given CS and a given US, there are four types of trials to be considered: CS and US present, CS present and US absent, CS absent and US present, and CS and US absent./3 is a parameter (between zero and one) of the US with one value when that US is present and another smaller--but, importantly, nonzero---value when the US is absent, ct is a parameter of the CS that is between zero and one when that CS is present and is precisely zero when the CS is absent. Because a is nonzero only on trials in which the CS is present, the associative value of the CS can potentially change only on those trials. On trials in which the CS is absent, ct is always zero according to the Rescoda-Wagner model, and therefore the associative status of the CS cannot change. Thus, the original RescodaWagner model predicts no (direct) change in the associative status of a CS on trials in which the CS is absent. This failure to predict a direct effect on CS associative status of trials in which the CS is absent is contrary to the phenomenon of backward blocking as well as several other observations with human subjects (e.g., Van Hamme & Wasserman, 1994) .
However, the Rescorla-Wagner (1972) model predicts that trials on which the CS is absent can influence the associative status of the CS indirectly by changing the associative status of other cues (including background cues) that are present on that trial. The altered status of these other cues can influence what is learned about the CS on subsequent trials in which the CS and these other cues are present. This impact on subsequent trials that include the CS is due to the difference in V~ that results from changes in the status of these other cues. It is this mechanism that allows the Rescorla-Wagner model to predict forward blocking but not backward blocking. Specifically, in the forwardblocking procedure the target (i.e., to-be-blocked) stimulus and the blocking stimulus are presented in Phase 2, which is subsequent to the Phase 1 trials in which the blocking stimulus alone is reinforced. Consequently, the reinforcement of the blocking stimulus alone during Phase 1 can then indirectly influence what is learned about the target stimulus in Phase 2. In contrast, in the backward-blocking procedure the target stimulus is presented in Phase 1, which is prior to the Phase 2 trials in which the blocking stimulus alone is reinforced. Consequently, the reinforcement of the blocking stimulus alone cannot influence (even indirectly) what was learned about the target stimulus in Phase 1. These predictions of the Rescorla-Wagner model are consistent with prior observations of forward blocking in humans and animals and failures to observe backward blocking in animals. However, they are inconsistent with prior reports of backward blocking in humans and the present evidence of backward blocking in animals from Experiment 1.
The revised Rescorla-Wagner model of Van Hamme and Wasserman (1994) differs from the original RescodaWagner model only in positing that a for a CS on a trial in which that CS is absent has a negative, rather than zero, value. Thus, the associative status of the CS is directly and immediately altered by a trial on which the CS does not occur. At the theoretical level, this change results in CSs and USs being treated more symmetrically; both CS and US representations are processed on trials during which they are absent.
At the empirical level, this seemingly small change allows the revised Rescorla-Wagner model to address several observations that are problematic for the original RescorlaWagner model. For example, it explains the observed differences in efficacy of the four different types of trials: CS and US present, CS present and US absent, CS absent and US present, and CS and US absent (e.g., . Additionally, unlike the original Rescorla-Wagner model, it predicts changes in responding to a CS as a result of either posttraining reinforcement or extinction of other cues that were present during training of that CS (i.e., companion stimuli). This predicted increase in responding to a target CS as a result of posttraining extinction of companion stimuli has been reported in animals (e.g., Dickinson & Charnock, 1985; Matzel, Schachtman, & Miller, 1985) , and the predicted decrease in responding to a target stimulus as a result of posttraining reinforcement of companion stimuli has been reported in humans (e.g., Chapman, 1991; Shanks, 1985) . Of course, backward blocking is an instance of posttraining reinforcement of a companion cue.
The comparator hypothesis and similar models that emphasize postacquisition processes in generating differences in behavior (e.g., Gibbon & Balsam, 1981; Shanks & Dickinson, 1987) have been used previously to explain these effects of posttraining revaluation of companion cues. However, these models predict that such effects should consistently occur, which is contrary to the prior failures to observe backward blocking in animals. In contrast, the original Rescorla-Wagner model, which emphasizes differential acquisition of associations, predicts that these effects should never occur, which is contrary to the prior reports of backward blocking in human causal judgment tasks and the outcome of Experiment 1. The Revised Rescorla-Wagner model (Van Hamme & Wasserman, 1994 ) is potentially able to explain why backward blocking is seen under some circumstances but not others.
The Revised Rescorla-Wagner model (which, like the original Rescorla-Wagner model, focuses on differential acquisition) provides a more mechanistic explanation of these effects than do the comparator models. Moreover, by allowing the different values of c~ for trials on which the CS is absent to depend on the species of the subject and the nature of the task, the Revised Rescorla-Wagner model seemingly can explain why backward blocking is observed only in some situations. If o~ for the absence of a given stimulus (i.e., the ability to process information about an absent stimulus) is assumed to be of smaller absolute value in animals than in humans, one would anticipate that backward blocking would be harder to obtain (i.e., require more trials) in animals than in humans (Van Hamme, 1994) . If this is correct, the previously reported absence of backward blocking in animals might merely reflect an inadequate number of pairings during Phase 2 of the blocking stimulus and the US; that is, backward blocking in animals should be observed with a large number of A---~US trials in Phase 2. Miller and Matute (1996) have tried to test this prediction by performing a conventional (i.e., no sensory preconditioning) backward-blocking study using rats with a large number (128) of Phase 2 trials (i.e., A---~US). Notably, no indication of backward blocking was observed. However, this was a null finding; despite the large number of Phase 2 trials, there may still have been too few to obtain backward blocking.
Let us now contrast the predictions concerning backward blocking (in animals) of the Revised Rescorla-Wagner model and our hypothesis about the effect of biological significance on cue competition. Van Hamme's (1994) explanation of the species difference in backward blocking (i.e., animals have a smaller absolute value of a on CSabsent trials) is diametrically opposed to our assertion that biologically significant stimuli are less subject to blocking. We are proposing that cues of lower biological significance will be more subject to cue competition, whereas the Revised Rescorla-Wagner model suggests that cues of lower biological significance (i.e., presumably with lower c~ for the target stimulus present and lower a for the target stimulus absent) should be less subject to changes in associative status on trials during which the target stimulus (X) is absent. Moreover, according to the Revised RescorlaWagner model a reduction in the biological significance of the cue acting as a surrogate for the US (B) should also retard blocking. That is, in Experiment 1, the surrogate for the US was an innocuous stimulus, presumably with low/3 and )t values. These low/3 and )t values of the US surrogate (B) should have reduced the rate at which the target stimulus (X) was devalued during Phase 2 in the backwardblocking groups, relative to the more conventional backward-blocking groups of prior reports that were presented with a biologically significant US (instead of B as in our sensory preconditioning procedure) during blocking treatment. Thus, according to the Revised Rescorla-Wagner model, our use of a sensory preconditioning procedure should have impaired, rather than facilitated, backward blocking, relative to prior failures to obtain backward blocking in animals using conventional USs (e.g., Miller et al., 1990; Schweitzer & Green, 1982) .
However, the preceding comparisons are between hypothetical backward-blocking groups trained with either conventional USs or a sensory preconditioning procedure. If we limit our comparisons to the groups actually used in Experiment 1, the Revised Rescorla-Wagner model does predict the backward-blocking effect that we observed. That is, for the backward-blocking group, this model predicts a reduction of the X-B association during the Phase 2 trials because the outcome, B, (with the blocking stimulus, A) was presented without the target stimulus, X. For the control group, this model predicts a weak augmentation of the X-B association during the Phase 2 trials because neither the target CS (X) nor the outcome (B) were presented. We performed Experiment 2 to test the Revised Rescorla-Wagner model's interpretation of Experiment 1, as well as to further assess the potential of a sensory preconditioning procedure to reveal backward blocking in animals using a different control group than was used in Experiment 1.
Experiment 2
Experiment 1 suggested that backward blocking occurs if the cues are of low biological significance during the blocking treatment, but the finding is novel and calls for replication, which is provided in Experiment 2. Moreover, the control group in Experiment 1 was somewhat unusual for a blocking study. It did meet the basic requirement for a blocking control group in that, during the differential treatment phase, the blocking stimulus (A) was not paired with the cue acting as a surrogate for the US (B). However, the backward-blocking group received more exposures to the outcome (B) than did the control group prior to the B----~US pairings of Phase 3. Consequently, the backward-blocking group might have been retarded relative to the control group in forming a B-US association during Phase 3 due to latent inhibition of Stimulus B. Thus, the low-conditioned responding to the target stimulus (X) observed in the backward-blocking group of Experiment 1 might have reflected an ineffective B-US association rather than blocking of the X-B association. Relative to Experiment 1, a better backward-blocking analog to a conventional control treatment for forward blocking might have consisted of presenting the control group with pairings of some cue other than the blocking stimulus and the cue acting as a surrogate for the US. In the present situation, this would take the form of a novel stimulus (C) being paired with the US surrogate (B) during Phase 2. Such a control group (Control 1) was included in Experiment 2.
Moreover, the possibility exists that, rather than the Phase 2 treatment received by the backward-blocking group of Experiment 1 impairing conditioned suppression to the target stimulus (X), the Phase 2 treatment of the control group might have enhanced suppression to the target stimulus. The potential mechanism for such an outcome is not obvious, but it is conceivable that the A----~C pairings experienced by the control group in Phase 2 (see Table 2 ) could have extinguished the previously acquired A-B association formed during Phase 1, thereby increasing the effectiveness of the X-B association formed during Phase 1. To examine this possibility, a second control group (Control 2) was included in Experiment 2. Control 2 received no treatment other than equivalent handling and exposure to the experimental context during Phase 2.
A third benefit of the new control groups is that they allowed testing of the interpretation of Experiment 1 provided by the Revised Rescorla-Wagner model (Van Hamme & Wasserman, 1994) . We reserve elaboration of this until the discussion of Experiment 2.
Other than these changes in control treatments, the rationale, logic, and procedure of Experiment 2 were the same as those for Experiment 1. As in Experiment 1, we modified the conventional sensory preconditioning procedure so that both phases of blocking were embedded within the first phase of conventional sensory preconditioning, This permitted us to examine backward blocking in the absence of biologically significant stimuli. Table 3 illustrates the central aspects of the procedure for Experiment 2.
Me~od Subjects and Apparatus
The subjects were 18 male and 18 female naive SpragueDawley rats (80-110 days old) from our own breeding colony. Body weights were 195-375 g for males and 170-255 g for females. Animal housing and deprivation schedule were the same as in Experiment 1. Subjects were assigned to three groups (n = 12), counterbalanced for sex. The apparatus was identical to that of Experiment 1.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1 except for the treatment of the two control groups during Phase 2 and the counterbalancing of physical cues. Thus, the following procedure section is abbreviated. The buzzer and the tone, counterbalanced within groups, served as the blocking stimulus (A) and the control stimulus (C); the click train served as the target stimulus (X); and the white noise served as the cue acting as the surrogate for the US (B) during the blocking phases (see Table 3 ).
Acclimation (Day 1) and Phase 1 (training with the AX compound on Day 2). Treatment was identical to Experiment 1.
Phase 2: Training with A or C (Days 3-7) . During each daily 60-min session, the backward-blocking group received four presentations of the blocking stimulus (A), each followed at offset by the US surrogate (A---~B). Control 1 received four presentations of the control stimulus (C) followed at offset by the US surrogate (C----~B). Intertrial intervals were the same as in Phase 1. Control 2 simply spent the session in the experimental context with no CS nor US presentations.
Phase 3: First-order conditioning of B (Day 8), reacclimation (Days 9-10), test with X (Day 11), and test with A (Day 12).
Each of these procedures was the same as those in Experiment 1.
Results and Discussion
The central finding of this experiment was less suppression to the target stimulus (X) in the backward-blocking group than in Control 1 or Control 2. These observations are indicative of the phenomenon of backward blocking.
The left side of Figure 2 depicts mean time to drink for 5 cumulative seconds in the presence of the target stimulus (X) on Day 11. Inspection of Figure 2 reveals less conditioned suppression to the target stimulus in the backwardblocking group than in Control 1 or Control 2. Statistical analysis found differences between groups, F(2, 33) = 6.29. Planned comparisons determined that the backwardblocking group suppressed less than did either control group, Fs(1, 33) --6.10. Thus, backward blocking was observed in the backward-blocking group relative to Control 1 and Control 2.
The right side of Figure 2 depicts mean time to drink for 5 cumulative seconds in the presence of the blocking stimulus (A) on Day 12. Although the backward-blocking group tended to exhibit more suppression to the blocking stimulus than did Control 1 or Control 2, these differences were far from significant.
On neither test day did any subject take more than 60 seconds to complete its initial 5 cumulative seconds of drinking prior to onset of the test stimulus. Additionally, the three groups did not differ on this measure on either test day, ps > .5. Thus, the three groups did not exhibit differential fear of the experimental context.
One possible interpretation of the results of Experiment 2 is that responding to the target stimulus (X) by Control 1 and Control 2 was mediated through an associative chain consisting of an X-A association, an A-B association, and a B-US association. Assuming bidirectionality of extinction, the backward-blocking group may have failed to respond to the target stimulus (X) because the X-A association was extinguished during the A--~B pairings of Phase 2, in which subjects were exposed to A but not X (see Table  3 ). Although this explanation is able to explain the results of Experiment 2, it is unable to explain the observations of Experiment 1, In Experiment 1, the backward-blocking group and the control group were equally exposed to the blocking stimulus (A) in the absence of the blocked stimulus (X) during Phase 2; thus, similar extinction of the X-A Wagner model that appears able to explain the present results. Specifically, Dickinson and Burke propose that an absent CS is not processed on a given trial unless on that trial a punctate cue is present that has a within-compound association to the CS. In this framework, the presence of the blocking stimulus (A) during Phase 2 for the backwardblocking group but not for Control 1 and Control 2 leads to the prediction that the X-B association should be degraded for the backward-blocking group but not for either of the control groups, which is consistent with our observations. Of course both Van Hamme and Wasserman's (1994) and Dickinson and Burke's (1996) versions of the Revised Rescorla-Wagner model have difficulty in explaining why our use of a sensory preconditioning procedure facilitated rather than impaired backward blocking in animals (see the discussion of Experiment 1).
The present demonstration of backward blocking indicates that the backward blocking observed in Experiment 1 is replicable. Moreover, the treatment of Control 1 was more analogous to the control condition conventionally used in studies of forward blocking and precludes an explanation based on latent inhibition. Thus, Experiment 2 demonstrates that the apparent backward blocking observed in Experiment 1 was not due to an unusual choice of control group treatment in that experiment. Collectively, Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that backward blocking can be obtained in animals. Moreover, in conjunction with prior demonstrations that backward blocking is not observed when the target stimulus (X) is permitted to become biologically significant during Phase 1 of training (e.g., Miller et al., 1990; Schweitzer & Green, 1982) , the present results suggest that a critical factor in obtaining backward blocking is preventing the target stimulus from becoming biologically significant. association should have occurred in the two groups. However, the control group responded vigorously to the target stimulus (X), whereas the backward-blocking group did not. Now let us examine the Revised Rescoda-Wagner model of Van Hamme and Wasserman (1994) , which was successful in predicting the backward blocking observed in Experiment 1. For Experiment 2, the model predicts backward blocking not only in the backward-blocking group, but also in Control 1 relative to Control 2 (see Table 3 ). In Phase 2, both the backward-blocking group and Control 1 experienced the US surrogate (B) without the target stimulus (X) in the same context in which they were trained during Phase 1, which according to the Revised Rescorla-Wagner model should have attenuated the X-B association; whereas Control 2 received equivalent exposure to the context without any discrete stimulus presentations, which consequently should have slightly strengthened the X-B association. This prediction is inconsistent with the backward blocking observed in the backward-blocking group relative to Control 1 and Control 2, which did not behaviorally differ from each other. Thus, the Revised Rescorla-Wagner model cannot explain the results of Experiment 2. However, Dickinson and Burke (1996) offer a variant of the Revised RescorlaExperiment 3 Experiments 1 and 2 assessed the prediction that backward blocking is more apt to occur if the target stimuli are not biologically significant at the time of backwardblocking treatment. In conventional backward-blocking procedures, the target stimulus (X) is made biologically significant as a result of the AX----~US pairings of Phase 1 (see Table 1 ). Thus, the biological significance of the target stimulus during the blocking phase is ordinarily an acquired attribute of that stimulus. However, cues can be biologically significant as a consequence of their own physical properties as well as through association. For example, food, sex, electric shock, and other traditional reinforcers are presumably of inherent biological significance. Additionally, a cue of high intensity (such as a loud noise) is also apt to be of higher biological significance than the otherwise equivalent cue at a low or moderate intensity. For example, a loud noise is presumably of greater biological significance than an otherwise equivalent noise of moderate intensity. Two studies in the literature encouraged our thinking that a cue of inherently high biological significance may be protected from cue competition. First, Mackintosh (1976) reported that intense auditory CSs are not subject to overshadowing. Second, Hall, Mackintosh, Goodall, and Dal Martello (1977) reported a study in which the to-be-blocked stimulus in a forward-blocking procedure was an intense auditory stimulus rather than a conventional auditory cue of moderate intensity. They found that not only was this stimulus not blocked, but also that the blocking stimulus (which was of moderate intensity) actually lost behavioral control. Assuming that intense cues are of greater biological significance than cues of moderate intensity (all other things being equal), these findings suggest that cues of high biological significance are resistant to cue competition.
Hypotheses are best assessed through convergent evidence. Toward providing convergent evidence concerning our hypothesis that biological significance discourages cue competition, Experiment 3 tested the hypothesis with respect to inherent biological significance (rather than acquired biological significance as in Experiments 1 and 2). In particular, Experiment 3 examined the effect on cue competition of using CSs of intense physical intensity, and hence presumably of high inherent biological significance. Our hypothesis was that cue competition, which is ordinarily observed with cues of low biological significance (e.g., moderate or low intensity sounds), would not be seen if the target cue were of high inherent biological significance (e.g., of high intensity). In Experiment 3, we used a forward-blocking procedure to test this specific prediction because it ordinarily yields cue competition with CSs of low or moderate intensity. As previously stated, forward blocking, unlike backward blocking, seemingly does not allow the target stimulus to become biologically significant during training (see pp. 370-372). The critical question was whether cues of inherent biological significance (operationalized through stimulus intensity) would be protected from cue competition, as was seen to be the case with cues of acquired biological significance in Experiments 1 and 2. Table 4 illustrates the central aspects of the procedure used in Experiment 3. Essentially, there were forwardblocking experimental and forward-blocking control groups trained with high intensity stimuli (the forward-blocking-athigh-intensity group and Control 1 at high intensity, respectively) and similar groups trained with moderate intensity stimuli (the forward-blocking-at-moderate-intensity group and Control 1 at moderate intensity, respectively). In the high-intensity condition, there was a possibility that suppression to the target stimulus (X', with the prime denoting high intensity) could be unconditioned due to the high intensity of the target stimulus. To control for this possibility in the high-intensity condition (in which we anticipated strong suppression to the target stimulus, i.e., no blocking), we included another control group (Control 2 at high intensity). Control 2 at high intensity, unlike the other two groups in the high-intensity condition, experienced the A'X' compound and the US unpaired in Phase 2. If responding to the high-intensity target stimulus (X') in the forward-blockingat-high-intensity group were unconditioned, we should have observed equivalent unconditioned responding in Control 2 at high intensity.
The stimulus of interest was the target stimulus (X or X'), and it was the intensity of that stimulus that we wanted to manipulate. However, if we had varied the intensity of only the target stimulus and left the intensity of the other CSs (A and C) constant (moderate or high intensity), we would have run the risk of perceptual masking of the moderate stimulus by the accompanying high-intensity target stimulus in the high-intensity condition. Our concern was with cue competition between perceived stimuli, not perceptual masking. Therefore, to preclude perceptual masking, we matched the intensity of the blocking stimulus (A or A') and the control stimulus (C or C') with that of the target stimulus (X or X') within each group.
Method Subjects
The subjects were 30 male and 30 female naive SpragueDawley rats (80-110 days old) from our own breeding colony. Body weights were 200-320 g for males and 160-250 g for females. The animals were housed and maintained as in Experiments 1 and 2. Subjects were assigned to five groups (n = 12), counterbalanced for sex.
Apparatus
Two types of experimental chambers were used. One was rectilinear in shape and measured 22.75 x 8.25 x 13.0 cm (length x width X height). The walls and ceiling were constructed of clear Plexiglas. The floor consisted of stainless steel rods 0.48 cm in diameter and spaced 1.5 cm apart, center-to-center. Adjacent rods Table 4 Design Summary for Experiment 3 Note. A and C, or A' and C' = high frequency tone and white noise, counterbalanced; X or X' = low frequency tone; A, C, and X = moderate intensity (10 dB above background); A', C', and X' = high intensity (30 dB above background); US = unconditioned stimulus (footshock); ~ = followed by; / = unpaired.
were connected through an NE-2 neon bulb. This allowed constant-current footshock to be delivered by means of a highvoltage AC circuit in series with a 1.0-MO resistor. Each of six copies of the rectilinear chamber was housed in a separate lightand sound-attenuating environmental chest. Each rectilinear chamber was dimly illuminated by a 2-W nominal (at 120 volts alternating current [VAC]) incandescent houselight driven at 56 VAC and mounted on an inside wall of the environmental chest approximately 30 cm from the center of the animal chamber. The second type of chamber was an enclosure 25.5 cm long in the shape of an upright truncated V. The enclosure was 28 cm high and 21 cm wide at the top, narrowing down to 5.25 cm wide at the bottom. The ceiling was constructed of clear Plexiglas. The floor and 25.5-cm-long side walls were constructed of sheet metal. The floor consisted of two 25.5-cm-long parallel metal plates, each 2 cm wide with a 1.25-cm gap between them. This floor was sufficiently narrow that the rat necessarily had to simultaneously stand on both metal plates, each of which served as an electrode for the delivery of footshock. Thus, a 1.0-mA, 0.5-s, constant-current footshock, which served as the US, could be delivered through the metal walls and the floor of the enclosure. Each of six copies of this V-shaped chamber was contained in a separate light-and sound-attenuating environmental chest. Each V-shaped chamber was dimly illuminated by a 7.5-W (nominal at 120 VAC) incandescent houselight driven at 56 VAC and mounted on an inside wall of the environmental chest approximately 30 cm from the center of the animal chamber. Light entered the animal chamber primarily by reflection from the roof of the environmental chest. The resultant light intensity in the V-shaped chambers roughly matched that in the rectilinear chambers due to the difference in the power of the houselights compensating for the difference in opaqueness of the walls of the two chamber types.
In both types of chambers, background noise, mostly from a ventilation fan, was 74 dB (C-scale) SPL. Three speakers on separate walls of the environmental chest were able to provide the following auditory cues: low-frequency complex tone (250 and 300 Hz), which served as the target stimulus (X and X'); highfrequency complex tone (3000 and 3200 Hz) and white noise, which served as the blocking stimulus (A and A') and the control stimulus (C and C'), counterbalanced within groups. For the two moderate-intensity groups (forward blocking at moderate intensity and Control 1 at moderate intensity), their three stimuli (A, X, and C), when presented, were always 10 dB(C) above background (i.e., 84 dB). For the three high-intensity groups (forward blocking at high intensity, Control 1 at high intensity, and Control 2 at high intensity), their three stimuli (A', X', and C'), when presented, were always 30 dB(C) above background (i.e., 104 dB).
Both types of chambers contained a cylindrical recess (axis perpendicular to the chamber wall) into which a water-filled lick tube could be inserted. Each drinking recess was 5 cm deep and 4.5 cm in diameter. The recess was left-right centered on the chamber wall, with its center 3.5 cm above the chamber floor. When in place, the lick tube protruded 1 cm forward from the far end of the recess. An infrared photobeam was projected horizontally across the recess approximately 0.5 cm in front of the lick tube. In order to drink, subjects had to insert their heads into the recess, thereby breaking the beam. Thus, the duration that subjects were accessing the lick tubes could be monitored.
Procedure
Because the unsignaled USs delivered to Control 2 at high intensity in Phase 2 might have resulted in a different degree of context conditioning than that of the other four groups and because context conditioning in the forward-blocking-at-high-intensity group and Control 1 at high intensity might have differed from that in the forward-blocking-at-moderate-intensity group and Control 1 at moderate intensity due to the differences in CS intensity, testing of all groups was performed in a context different from training. The two types of chambers were counterbalanced within each group in serving as the training and test contexts. All CSs (A', X', and C') for the three high-intensity groups (see Table 4 ) were consistently of high intensity, that is, 30 dB(C) above background. All CSs (A, X, and C) for the two moderate-intensity groups were consistently of moderate intensity, that is, 10 dB(C) above background. CS duration as well as US duration and intensity were the same as in Experiments 1 and 2.
Acclimation (Days 1-2) . On Day 1, each subject was acclimated to its training context for 60 rain during which the context's lick tube was available. On Day 2, each subject was acclimated to its test context for 60 rain during which the lick tube was available. All lick tubes were removed following acclimation.
Phase 1: Training with A, A', C, . During each daily 40-rain session in the training context, the forwardblocking-at-moderate-intensity group was exposed to four A---~US pairings, whereas the forward-blocking-at-high-intensity group and Control 2 at high intensity were exposed to four A'---~US pairings. These pairings were intended to establish the blocking stimuli (A and A') as reliable signals for the US. Control 1 at moderate intensity and Control 1 at high intensity received comparable C---~US and C'---~US pairings, respectively. Two different pseudorandom schedules for trial distribution were used on alternate days of training. Trials were initiated 8, 25, 30, and 38 min into the session on one schedule and 6, 15, 30, and 35 rain into the session on the other schedule.
Phase 2: Training with the AX or A 'X' compound (Day 9). For the forward-blocking-at-moderate-intensity group and Control 1 at moderate intensity, the AX compound was presented four times pseudorandomly during a single 40-min session in the training context. Trials occurred 8, 25, 30, and 38 min into the session. For the forward-blocking-at-high-intensity group, Control 1 at high intensity, and Control 2 at high intensity, the A'X' compound was presented instead. For all groups except Control 2 at high intensity, the US was presented immediately upon offset of the compound CS. For Control 2 at high intensity, the US was presented the same number of times, but at least 2 min removed from any presentation of the compound CS (specifically, 2, 16, 28, and 34 min into the session).
Reacclimation (Days 10-11), test with X or X' (Day 12), and test with A or A ' (Day 13).
Procedures during these three phases of the study were identical to those in Experiments 1 and 2 except that they occurred in the test context. All subjects were tested first with the target stimulus and then with the blocking stimulus. Specifically, the moderate-intensity groups were tested with X and A, whereas the high-intensity groups were tested with X' and A'. Thus, the CS intensities from Phases 1 and 2 were maintained. CSs that are more intense at the time of testing ordinarily elicit more vigorous responding than do stimuli of lower intensity (e.g., Kamin, 1965) . Consequently, no direct comparisons were conducted between the groups that were trained and tested with the moderateintensity CSs and the groups that were trained and tested with the high-intensity CSs.
Preanalysis treatment of data. Data from one animal each from Control 1 at high intensity and Control 1 at moderate intensity as well as data from two subjects from the forward-blocking-at-highintensity group were discarded due to the subjects taking more than 60 s to complete an initial 5 cumulative seconds of licking (i.e., prior to onset of the test stimulus) on at least one of the two test days.
Results and Discussion
The central finding of this experiment was attenuated conditioned suppression to the target stimulus (X) in the forward-blocking-at-moderate-intensity group relative to Control 1 at moderate intensity, but equivalent suppression to the target stimulus in the forward-blocking-at-highintensity group, Control 1 at high intensity, and Control 2 at high intensity. Thus, (forward) blocking was observed in the moderate-intensity condition but not in the high-intensity condition. CS intensity (and presumably inherent biological significance of cues) appears to be a determinant of susceptibility to blocking.
The left side of Figure 3 depicts mean time to drink for 5 cumulative seconds in the presence of the target stimuli (X and X') on Day 12. Inspection of Figure 3 reveals less conditioned suppression to the moderate-intensity target stimulus (X) in the forward-blocking-at-moderate-intensity group than in Control 1 at moderate intensity, F(1, 21) = 4.86, which is indicative of (forward) blocking in the moderate-intensity condition. Analysis of the suppression to the high-intensity target stimulus (X') also detected differences between groups, F(2, 30) = 4.20. But this difference arose primarily from the low scores in Control 2 at high intensity. Not only did the forward-blocking-at-high-intensity group and Control 1 at high intensity not differ statistically, but the forward-blocking-at-high-intensity group tended (nonsignificantly) to suppress more to the target stimulus than did Control I at high intensity. Thus, no tendency toward blocking was observed with the high-intensity CSs. Moreover, the possibility that the high scores in the forward-blockingat-high-intensity group were due to unconditioned suppression to the target stimulus can be rejected on the basis of the low level of suppression to the target stimulus seen in Figure 3 . Experiment 3: Solid bars depict mean time in log seconds to lick for 5 cumulative seconds in the presence of the target stimulus (X), and striped bars depict mean time in log seconds to lick for 5 cumulative seconds in the presence of the blocking stimulus (A). Error bars represent standard errors of means. CS = conditioned stimulus; FB-M = the forward-blocking-at-moderateintensity group; CON1-M = Control 1 at moderate intensity; FB-H = the forward-blocking-athigh-intensity group; CON1-H = Control 1 at high intensity; CON2-H = Control 2 at high intensity.
Control 2 at high intensity relative to the forward-blockingat-high-intensity group, F(1, 30) = 7.32. If suppression to the target stimulus by the forward-blocking-at-highintensity group was unconditioned, it would also have been observed in Control 2 at high intensity. Thus, the absence of blocking in the high-intensity condition was not a result of unconditioned suppression to the target stimulus masking a blocking effect.
An additional possibility that must be considered is that blocking was not observed in the high-intensity condition because of a ceiling effect. That is, suppression to the target stimulus in all the groups tested with the high-intensity stimulus might have been elevated to the point that real differences in suppression to the target stimulus were masked by the 10-min maximum that was imposed on all individual scores. However, inspection of individual scores revealed that only two animals in the entire study suppressed to X' for the full 10 min. Thus, this explanation of the lack of blocking in the high-intensity condition is not supported by the data. Consequently, we can conclude that blocking did not occur in the high-intensity condition, which is in marked contrast to the blocking that was observed in the moderate-intensity condition with all other factors being equal.
The right side of Figure 3 illustrates suppression to the blocking stimuli (A and A'). Consider first the two groups in the moderate-intensity condition. Inspection of Figure 3 indicates a higher level of suppression to the blocking stimulus by the forward-blocking-at-moderate-intensity group than by Control 1 at moderate intensity, F(1, 21) = 4.74. This is not surprising in light of the greater number of A---~US pairings received by the forward-blocking-atmoderate-intensity group. Turning to the three groups in the high-intensity condition, no overall statistical differences were observed among groups, F(2, 30) = 2.52, .05 < p < .10. However, it is evident from Figure 3 that the forwardblocking-at-high-intensity group tended to suppress more to the blocking stimulus than did Control 2 at high intensity, F(1, 30) = 4.90. This tendency was expected because the forward-blocking-at-high-intensity group experienced the blocking stimulus (A') paired with the US in both phases of training, whereas Control 2 at high intensity had the blocking stimulus paired with the US in Phase 1 and effectively received extinction treatment for that stimulus in Phase 2. Control 1 at high intensity, which had no experience with the A' in Phase 1 and which experienced A'--~US pairings in Phase 2, performed at an intermediate level that statistically differed from neither the forward-blocking-at-highintensity group nor Control 1 at high intensity.
On neither test day did the five groups differ in mean time to complete 5 cumulative seconds of drinking prior to onset of the test stimulus, ps > .5. Thus, the five groups did not exhibit differential fear of the experimental context.
The present results indicate that blocking is less apt to occur with intense stimuli than with moderate stimuli. Moreover, the fact that all CSs for a given group were of equal intensity makes implausible the possibility that perceptual masking was a significant factor in the present experiment. On the other hand, as a consequence of this equality of CS intensities within groups, all we may rigorously conclude is that blocking is less likely when all CSs are of high intensity than when all CSs are of moderate intensity. However as we previously mentioned, Hall et al. (1977) performed a forward-blocking experiment in which the to-be-blocked stimulus was of high intensity and the blocking stimulus was of moderate intensity. Despite the blocking stimulus being of moderate intensity, they observed no blocking, which is similar to the results obtained in the present study. Of course, the outcome of the Hall et ai. experiment can be viewed in terms of perceptual masking. But the common outcomes of the present study and that of Hail et al. suggest that the lack of blocking seen when a high-intensity target stimulus is used is not due to either perceptual masking or the high intensity of the blocking stimulus (as opposed to the blocked stimulus).
Thus, the results of this study in conjunction with those of Hall et al. (1977) lead to the conclusion that blocking is less likely to occur when specifically the target stimulus is of high intensity. Assuming that stimuli of high physical intensity are of greater biological significance than are stimuli of moderate intensity, the present results are congruent with those of Experiments 1 and 2, which found backward blocking to occur with a CS of low biological significance.
There is an additional implication that follows from the results of Experiment 3. In Experiments 1 and 2, cue competition (in the form of backward blocking) was obtained with cues of low biological significance. However, Experiments 1 and 2 used a sensory preconditioning procedure, whereas the prior studies of backward blocking did not use such a procedure (e.g., Miller et al., 1990; Schweitzer & Green, 1982) . Thus, it is possible that the presence of cue competition in Experiments 1 and 2 was the result of some aspect of the sensory preconditioning procedure other than the fact that it prevented the target stimulus (X) from acquiring biological significance during the blocking procedure. Experiment 3 speaks directly to this possibility. In Experiment 3, cue competition did not occur when the cues were of high biological significance, but did occur when the cues were of low biological significance despite the use of identical procedures (devoid of sensory preconditioning) for the cues of low and high biological significance. This suggests that biological significance, rather than the specific training procedure used, is a critical determinant of cue competition.
Neither the Revised Rescorla-Wagner model nor the original Rescorla-Wagner model nor any other model of which we are currently aware can explain why the high biological significance of intense CSs compared to moderate-intensity CSs impairs forward blocking (see Table  4 ). In both the original and the Revised Rescorla-Wagner models, more intense CSs would be expected to possess higher values of a, with the consequence of better acquisition during Phase 1 training with A' than with A. This in turn should have produced greater blocking in Phase 2 for the forward-blocking-at-high-intensity group than for the forward-blocking-at-moderate-intensity group (or equal blocking if asymptotic acquisition was achieved in Phase 1 with CSs of moderate intensity). Thus, the outcome of Experiment 3 is problematic for the Revised RescorlaWagner model, and the outcomes of all three experiments are inexplicable in terms of the original Rescorla-Wagner model.
General Discussion
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated backward blocking in animals using an experimental design in which the backward-blocking treatment was embedded within a sensory preconditioning procedure that prevented the target stimulus (X) from acquiring biological significance in Phase 1. Experiment 3 found that forward blocking occurs more readily with CSs of moderate intensity (i.e., low biological significance) than CSs of high intensity (i.e., high biological significance). Thus far, we have focused primarily on the view that prior differences in backward blocking between humans and animals were due to the biological significance of the USs that were used and not the difference in species used. We now examine and contrast several alternative potential explanations of these results. absent. Moreover, the Revised Rescorla-Wagner model correctly predicts the backward blocking in rats that was obtained in Experiment 1. But in Experiment 2 it incorrectly predicts equal backward blocking in the backward-blocking group and Control 1 relative to Control 2 (unless the Dickinson and Burke, 1996, variant of the Revised RescorlaWagner model is considered), and in Experiment 3 neither variant of the Revised Rescorla-Wagner model predicts the observed loss of forward blocking with intense CSs. Thus, the Revised Rescorla-Wagner model does not appear to provide a viable explanation of the present data. Although the present research offers little support for the Revised Rescorla-Wagner model, we believe that the model is important and will provide guidance for illuminating studies of learning in the future. Our hopes for the model stem from two factors: (a) the elegance of the model, particularly with respect to providing greater symmetry with respect to the processing of CSs and USs, and (b) its already proven success concerning immediate associative revaluation of a CS on CS-absent trials (Van Hamme & Wasserman, 1994) and cue competition other than backward blocking (Van Hamme, 1994) .
Alternative Explanations of the Present Results

Strong Associations Are Protected From Cue Competition
One possible interpretation of the present experiments is that strong CS-outcome associations are resistant to blocking. Perhaps the sensory preconditioning procedures of Phase 1 in Experiments 1 and 2 resulted in relatively weak associations, in contrast to stronger associations formed during Phase 1 of a conventional backward-blocking procedure with a traditional US. Hence, the Phase 2 treatment, which was intended to produce blocking, was working against weak associations in Experiments 1 and 2, whereas in prior studies that failed to observe backward blocking the associations that were to be blocked were much stronger (e.g., Miller et al., 1990; Schweitzer & Green, 1982) . This view offers a viable explanation of the results of Experiments 1 and 2. However, in Experiment 3 there is no obvious reason for assuming that at the start of Phase 2 the high-intensity target CS had a stronger association to the US than did the low-intensity CS; yet, differential behavioral control developed. In this case one cannot appeal to a stronger CS-US association being resistant to blocking. Consequently, this position can explain the results of Experiments 1 and 2, but not 3.
The Revised Rescorla-Wagner Model
A second potential explanation of the observed discrepancy between forward and backward blocking in animals is offered by the Revised Rescorla-Wagner model of Van Hamme and Wasserman (1994) . This model offers an explanation of the commonly observed backward blocking in humans (given select control conditions) by attributing a nonzero a value to the CS on trials in which the CS is
Established Signals Are Protected From Cue Competition
Third, consider an early hypothesis that we formulated to explain the commonly observed presence of forward blocking and absence of backward blocking in animals. In the forward-blocking procedure, the to-be-blocked (target) stimulus never forms an effective association (see Footnote 3) with the signaled event in the trial (i.e., outcome, US, or effect). In contrast, the target stimulus in the conventional backward-blocking procedure presumably forms an effective association to the outcome in Phase 1, and then, if backward blocking actually occurs, loses it in Phase 2. Thus, one possible explanation of forward but not backward blocking in animals is based on this difference between the two procedures. That is, it may be easier to prevent a cue from forming an association (regardless of the biological significance of the potential associates) than it is to attenuate an association once it has been acquired. However, if the critical issue were the presence or absence of prior X-outcome associations at the time that the blocking stimulus alone is paired with the US, forward blocking would be ubiquitous (given sufficient A----~US trials) and backward blocking would never occur. Thus, this view does not explain why backward blocking is commonly seen in humans (e.g., Chapman, 1991; Shanks, 1985; Van Hamme, 1994; Williams et al., 1994) . Moreover, this view cannot explain why we obtained backward blocking in rats in Experiments 1 and 2, as the critical X----~B association was formed during the AX---~B trials of Phase 1, prior to the A----~B trials of Phase 2. Additionally, this view cannot explain why forward blocking in Experiment 3 was attenuated when CSs of high intensity were used; that is, it cannot explain why stimuli of high inherent biological significance appear to be immune to blocking.
Biologically Significant Stimuli Are Protected Against Cue Competition
A fourth interpretation of the observed difference in results between conventional forward-and backwardblocking procedures with animals hinges on whether the target stimulus is biologically significant to the subject at the time that the blocking stimulus alone is paired with the US. According to this hypothesis, cues of high biological significance (indexed by the degree of responding elicited) are resistant to cue competition including blocking. From an evolutionary viewpoint, it seems reasonable that biologically significant stimuli be privileged in information processing so as to be at least in part protected from cue competition. With a conventional forward-blocking procedure, the target cue never gains biological significance, whereas with a conventional backward-blocking procedure the target cue gains biological significance during Phase 1 (see Table 1 ). The present experiments provide a basis for assessing the importance of biological significance to cue competition. Experiments 1 and 2 used a sensory preconditioning procedure to demonstrate backward blocking in a situation in which the target cue was not endowed with biological significance during the blocking phases of training. Moreover, Experiment 3 demonstrated the absence of forward blocking in a situation that used a target cue of inherently high biological significant by virtue of its high intensity, that is, it controlled behavior (strong startle response) prior to the initiation of training. Thus, each of these observations lend support to the view that the biological significance of the target stimulus during the blocking treatment is a critical determinant of blocking.
Additional evidence that favors the biological significance interpretation comes from the human cue competition literature, which regularly reports both forward and backward blocking. We contend that the cover stories typically used in human causality studies do not make the target stimulus biologically significant to the subject. That is, hearing about an allergic reaction or a novel illness in a fictitious (or anonymous) patient is likely not important to the well-being of the subject in the way that direct receipt of food, water, or electric shock are to the subject in the typical experiment examining cue competition in animals.
Notably, this view says that stimuli of high biological significance are immune to cue competition; it does not say that cues of low biological significance are always vulnerable to cue competition. There are many instances of simple forward blocking failing to occur (most are unpublished because they are null results) that suggest low biological significance alone is not always sufficient for cue competition to occur. Thus, low biological significance appears necessary but not sufficient for the occurrence of cue competition.
We conclude that the biological significance of the target stimulus appears to be an important factor in determining whether or not blocking occurs. To the degree that blocking is representative of cue competition in general, this suggests that biological significance may be an important factor in controlling other types of cue competition such as overshadowing (see Mackintosh, 1976 , for support of this view) and the relative validity effect. This conclusion is not to suggest that other factors do not also play a role in determining whether or not cue competition will occur in a given situation. For example, Williams et al. (1994) have argued compellingly that conditions that encourage the processing of stimulus elements (as opposed to configured stimuli) favor cue competition. Based on this notion, Williams et al. predicted that forward blocking (in which Phase 1 treatment [A---~US] encourages the processing of A and X as independent stimulus elements) should be more robust than backward blocking (in which Phase 1 treatment [AX---~US] strongly encourages processing of an AX-configured stimulus).
Can Biological Significance Be Subsumed by Some Previously Existing Variable?
We considered the possibility that the concept of biological significance could be subsumed under the set of conditions that favor the processing of independent stimulus elements as opposed to the configuring of elements. However, there is reason to think that this is not the case. Specifically, Williams et al. (1994) found, for human subjects, that configuring of simultaneous cues is normal (i.e., the default condition). Moreover, they established that reinforcement contingencies that require the independent processing of stimulus elements are necessary to obtain processing of individual elements, and that this is necessary to obtain competition between elements. However, in the present research reinforcement was accurately predicted by compound cues (e.g., AX). Consequently, in the framework of Williams et al., configuring would be expected, and no backward blocking should have been observed in Experiments 1 or 2. Moreover, there is little a priori reason to think that the use of a sensory preconditioning procedure (in Experiments 1 and 2) would have favored the processing of elements over the processing of configured stimuli. Nor is there a priori reason to expect that the switch from moderate-intensity CSs to high-intensity CSs (in Experiment 3) would have promoted the processing of configured stimuli as opposed to elements. Thus, there is little reason to think that biological significance as a determinant of cue competition is merely a special instance of conditions that favor the processing of elemental stimuli.
One might ask whether the concept of biological significance as used here differs from that of stimulus salience, that is, a cue that commands a high degree of attention. In attentional terms, the present results could be described as cues that are of high salience, due either to their having become signals for biologically significant USs or to inherent reasons such as their being of high intensity, being relatively immune to cue competition. Attentional terminology suggests changes in perceptual processing, whereas "biological significance" as used here refers to the potential to elicit a response (and implies differences in the postperceptual processing of information as a function of biological significance). However, there is nothing in the current data to favor an explanation stated in terms of biological significance rather than in terms of attention.
it suggests that the effectiveness with which an alternative signal competes with a target signal will decrease as the biological significance of the target signal increases.
Some Potential Problems
A recent study by Lovibond and his colleagues (personal communication, June 3, 1995) might be viewed as contrary to our view that biological significance provides protection against cue competition. They used electric shock as a US with human subjects and obtained backward blocking. This finding would be problematic if their shock US were to be viewed as biologically significant. However, because of ethical considerations, they had subjects select their own shock intensities with instructions to increase the shock until it was "uncomfortable, but not painful." This might have resulted with a shock US that was so mild as to not serve as a biologically significant US.
Another potential problem for our view that cues of high biological significance are relatively immune to cue competition arises in the conditioned taste-aversion literature. One might expect that all flavors would be cues of inherently high biological significance to animals, and hence would be relatively immune to cue competition. However, there are several reports of blocking and overshadowing of flavors (e.g., Bonardi, Honey, & Hall, 1990; Revusky, 1971) . We acknowledge a potential problem here. However, these studies did not include parametric manipulation of the concentration of the target flavor to see if blocking decreases with increasing concentration of the target flavor as is seen with increasing intensity in other stimulus dimensions. We reserve final judgment until such a study is performed.
Conclusions
If the occurrence of backward blocking in humans but not in animals is actually due to differences in the biological significance of the USs used in studies with humans and animals (and specifically due to the biological significance acquired by the target stimulus in Phase 1 of backward blocking), then this difference in backward blocking arises from differences in the experimental preparations rather than from fundamental differences between species in information processing. This implication of the present research lends support to the view that there is a high degree of qualitative similarity in information processing among mammalian species.
For several hundred years, philosophers (e.g., Hume, 1739 Hume, /1964 have argued that associations (as well as causeand-effect relationships) depend on (a) perceived contingency of the input and output events, that is, a signal being perceived as necessary and sufficient for an outcome; (b) temporal and spatial contiguity of the input and output events; (c) temporal priority of the input event relative to the output event; and (d) absence of alternative signals for the outcome, that is, absence of cue competition. The present research speaks to the last of these conditions. Specifically,
